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Abstract 
The supposed undervaluation of the renminbi has been the subject of intensive 
academic research over the past few years. Using equilibrium exchange rate models 
(Purchasing Power Parity, BEER and FEER), many authors have concluded that the renminbi 
is undervalued by 15 to 30% against the dollar. 
 This article shows that the common view is not that obvious. The models used in the 
estimation (BEER or FEER) assume that the economy is at full-employment, a strong 
hypothesis for developing economies such as China, whose unemployed amount to 150 
million people. On the contrary, we show that China is facing massive unemployment and if 
investment depends on expected potential demand (from domestic consumption and foreign 
demand), then an undervalued exchange rate (by traditional standards) is suited for its policy 
objectives. Therefore the exchange rate can be analyzed as a policy tool used by the Chinese 
authorities to pursue their objectives. The exchange rate can be undervalued by traditional 
standards and in equilibrium compared to the government’s policy objectives. This article 
shows that equilibrium exchange rate theories are not suited for developing countries and 
therefore the concept of equilibrium exchange rate is highly questionable. The final section 
analyzes the adoption of a managed float regime by the Popular Bank of China and discusses 
the delicate issue of the best exchange rate regime for China. 
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Introduction 
The undervaluation of the renminbi-dollar exchange rate has been a major issue in 
policy and academic circles. Graph 1 shows the number of references to China’s exchange 
rate in economic journals. Many studies have estimated the equilibrium exchange rate of the 
renminbi using different theoretical frameworksTP4 PT. Most of them conclude that the scope of the 
undervaluation of the renminbi is between 15 and 30%. Yet China has been experiencing 
strong economic growth for a decade and does not seem to suffer from the supposed 
misalignment of its exchange rate, having a relative low inflation rate and current account 
surpluses.  
 
Graph 1: Number of articles in "Banking and Finance" and "Business and 
Management" sections containing the words "China" and "undervaluation" or 
"revalue" 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2002Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2003Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2004Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2005Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
 
Source: Lexis-Nexis. 
 
It appears therefore important to deepen the concept of undervaluation and to define 
accurately the equilibrium exchange rate standard. Some authors refer to the purchasing 
power parity but this theory does not apply to economies with different development levels 
like the United States and China. Other authors claim that the growing American current 
account deficits or the persistence of massive unemployment in Western Europe are proofs of 
                                                 
TP
4
PT See for instance: Jeong and Mazier (2003),  Bénassy-Quéré and al. (2004), Wang (2004),  Frunke and Rahn 
(2004), Coudert and Couharde (2005), Dunaway and Li (2005) and Frankel (2005). 
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the Renminbi undervaluation. The global imbalances would be the consequence of the policy 
implemented by the Popular Bank of China (PBC), which aims at stabilizing its exchange rate 
at a very low level. But in an International Monetary System without a code of good conduct, 
the exchange rate strategy of a country can only be judged with reference to its own interests. 
Who can say that the FED is taking Europe interests into account while defining its exchange 
rate policy? The Chinese exchange rate strategy can only be evaluated with reference to its 
growth strategy, and the Chinese growth strategy appears very successful, leading the 
unbiased observer to blame the European or the United States’ economic policies for global 
imbalances.  
Some economists (in particular American economists from the Institute for 
International Economics: Goldstein (2004, 2005), Goldstein and Lardy (2003, 2005), 
Williamson (2004), Bergsten (2006), but also Frankel (2004)) ask China to revalue its 
exchange rate from 15 to 40%, which would make it possible to revalue all Asian currencies 
and thus to decrease world imbalances. They agree with the American Congress which 
threatens China of commercial sanctions if it does not revalue significantly. On the contrary, 
some other economists (McKinnon, 2004, 2005; Bosworth, 2004; Dooley and alii, 2004; 
Aglietta, 2005) claim that China should not yield to the American pressures. Revaluing the 
Renminbi would slow down  its growth and involve a crisis similar to Japan’s after its 
Endaka. 
This article aims at showing that the equilibrium exchange rate models commonly 
used are not relevant for a developing country such as China, which is not aiming at achieving 
its equilibrium. Indeed China has been experiencing massive unemployment for years; an 
undervalued exchange rate according to traditional standards allows it to impulse strong 
economic growth required to reduce unemployment. As a policy tool, the exchange rate is at 
an appropriate level with regard to Chinese economic growth. Broadly speaking, the optimal 
exchange rate for a developing country can only be defined with regard to a growth strategy: 
the more the country needs economic growth, the more it has to increase savings, the lower 
the exchange rate has to be. 
The remainder of the article is as follows :Part I describes the main facts of the 
Chinese economy from 1994, when the country decided to move to a de jure floating 
exchange rate regime, while moving to a de facto peg to dollar. Part II analyzes equilibrium 
exchange rate estimations; Part III proposes a model in which the exchange rate is willingly 
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fixed at a low level to achieve strong economic growth. Part IV analyzes the reform of the 
Chinese exchange rate regime since July 2005. 
 
1. A strong economic growth 
China has been experiencing dramatic economic growth for a decade (graph 2): from 
1995 to 2004, its GDP growth has been 8.5% per year while 3.3% in the US and 2.2% in the 
Eurozone. Only a few Asian countries have experienced such growth: Vietnam and Myanmar 
(7.2%) and India (6.1%). 
 
Graph 2: Real GDP growth for the US, European Union and China. 
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Source: NBS, BEA, Eurostat. 
 
Since 2003, the worsening of the US current account (6.5% of GDP in 2005, 5 points 
more than in 1993-1997) has lead to violent disputes against China, arguing that the Chinese 
exchange rate regime could be hold responsible of the deindustrialization of the American 
economy. The American current account deficit would be a consequence of the trade deficit 
with China (graph 3), blamed for fixing its exchange rate at an “undervalued” level against he 
dollar. Yet the American deficit with China stands for a small part of American global deficit 
(approximately 20%) and therefore cannot be on its own a proof of the Renminbi 
The Renminbi equilibrium exchange rate: an agnostic view 
 5
undervaluation. The Renminbi exchange rate ought to be assessed according to a Chinese 
point of view: does it promote growth or does it lead to unsustainable imbalances? 
 
Graph 3: American Trade deficit (quarterly data – billions of US $) 
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Source: BEA, Survey of Current Business. 
 
1.1. The renminbi exchange rate: a tool to promote development 
The Renminbi is the Chinese currency, its base unit is the Yuan. From 1994 to July 
2005, the renminbi-dollar nominal exchange rate was fixed at 8.277 RMB for a dollar. 
Despite official speeches claiming that China moved to a floating exchange rate regime, 
Chinese authorities stabilized the exchange rate at this level from the 1 Pst P of January 1994 to 
the 21Pst P of July 2005 with a very narrow margin (+/-0.18%). On the 21st July 2005, the PBC 
reevalued the Yuan by 2.1% to 8.11 RMB for a dollar (with a band of +/-0.3%). The PBC also 
announced that the Chinese currency would be anchored to a currency basket (dollar, euro, 
won and yen), without defining the weights attached to each currency. Since then, the RMB 
has been slowly appreciating to 8.005RMB in May 2006. Its total rise is 3.3%, while the US 
were demanding a significant appreciation (around 20%) and were threatening China of 
protectionist measures. Yet the PBC announcement allowed it to lower the pressure and to 
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show its commitment in modifying its strategy, while underlining it would keep its freedom 
of choice. 
 
Graph 4: Chinese Effective exchange rateTP5 PT (Base 100 in 1994) 
and nominal exchange rate against the dollar* 
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Source: Global Insight. 
 
The Chinese effective exchange had been appreciating from 1994 to 1997 because of 
inflation, which peaked to 24% in 1994. After 1994, the peg to the dollar has been a nominal 
anchor, leading to a fall of inflation under 3% as soon as 1997 (graph 5) which stabilized in 
return the effective exchange rate. The latter has been reproducing the fluctuations of the 
dollar: appreciation until 2001, depreciation from 2001 to 2004.A developing country with an 
undervalued currency would have experienced a substantial inflation, increasing its effective 
exchange rate, which is not the case for China. The exchange rate fixity, the price control and 
the absence of tensions on goods and labour markets enable China to stabilize its inflation on 
a low level. 
Since 1994, the PBC has chosen to maintain a peg to the dollar so as to promote 
substantial growth in China. China aims at incorporating workers in the modern economic 
system because it is facing massive under-unemployment and unemployment, especially in 
rural areas (Table 1 and box 1). China has chosen an export led growth strategy. A low 
exchange rate helps to preserve its competitiveness. Its central role explains that the PBC may 
                                                 
TP
5
PTBased on nominal exchange rates and consumer prices, trade weights are taken from the period 1988-1990, see 
Zanello and Desruelle (1997). 
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not want to allow speculation on its currency. In order to improve its economic and 
technological catching-up process, China needs Foreign Direct Investment and joint-ventures 
agreements; this pleads for a low exchange rate so as to maintain a high return on foreign 
investment. The undervaluation of the renminbi must be assessed with reference to this 
strategy. 
 
Graph 5: Inflation rate (consumer prices) in China 1987-2005 (quarterly data in %) 
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Source: NBS 
 
Table 1: Total Population, Labor force and employment in China (in millions) 
 1980 1990 1995 2000 2002 2004 
Total population 987.1 1.143.3 1.211.2 1.267.4 1.284.5 1.299.9 
Rural (en %) 80.6 73.6 71.0 63.8 60.9 58.2 
Labor force 429 653.2 687.4 739.9 753.6 768.2 
Employment 423 647.5 680.7 720.9 737.4 752.0 
– urban employment 105.3 170.4 190.4 231.5 247.8 264 
– rural employment 318.4 477.1 490.3 489.3 489.6 488 
Unemployed 5.4 5.7 6.7 19.0 16.2 16.2 
– in urban area 5.4 3.8 5.2 6.0 7.7 8.3 
–  in rural area 0 1.9 1.5 13.1 8.5 7.9 
Official unemployment rate (in %) 1.2 0.8 0.9 2.5 2.1 2.1 
Source: NBS 
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Box 1: Unemployment in China 
In spite of the dynamism of the growth, the question of unemployment is crucial in China. 
From 1995 to 2002, the public firms were restructured and saw their employment passing from 
113 to 72 millions. At the same time, in spite of the system of licence of residence (hokou), the 
differences in incomes attract the rural people towards the cities. Chinese figures of 
unemployment are questionable. According to the official sources, the urban unemployment rate is 
3.1% in 2002 (7.7 millions of umemployed). According to Brooks and alii (2004) it amounts to 
5.3% (13.9 millions). A study pursued by the Chinese Academy of Social Science in five cities 
assesses the urban unemployment at 12.7% (Gile and al. 2005). The Chinese Prime Minister has 
acknowledged that urban unemployment was above 7% in a speech in 2002. (OECD, 2005). The 
CIA World Factbook assesses it at 9.8%. According to Gile and alii (2005), the unemployment 
rate is undervalued. Official unemployment doesn’t take disguised unemployment, embodied by 
xiagang (people officially employed but who doesn’t work for their firms and earn unemployment 
benefit), and rural unemployment into account. The number of unemployed would be close to 
100-150 millions against 16 millions officially. Wang Jian, a research fellow of the State 
Development and Reform Commission, claims that there are more than 100 millions of 
unemployed in China in 2003. According to Brook (2004), China must currently create each year 
approximately 16 millions urban employment (+ 4% per annum): 9 millions because of the growth 
of the working-age population, 2 millions because of the job losses in the public firms and 5 
millions because of the rural migrations. 
 
Table 2: The extent of Chinese urban unemployment (in %) 
 2001 
Offical sources (ADB) 3.6 
The Economist 9.3 
CIA World Factbook 9.8 
Wang Jian (2003) 12-15 
Gile and  al (2005) 12.7 
NBS survey  (2001) 13.2 
 
 
The main criteria of undervaluation would be that a low level of the exchange rate 
leads to a too strong competitiveness, which would induce huge foreign demand, larger than 
the capacity of production, raising the inflation rate. Yet the flaw of the argument is that 
growth requires always some disequilibrium so that supply would be driven by demand. 
Moreover, the inflation rate has not risen over the past few years (graph 5). As a consequence, 
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most articles refer to the excessive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, linked with 
current account surplus and FDI (table 3), as evidences of undervaluation.  
 
Table 3: The renminbi undervaluation 
 Goldstein and Lardy 
(2003, 2004, 2005) 
Williamson  
(2003, 2004) 
Frankel 
(2004) 
Mc Kinnon 
(2003, 2005) 
PROOFS  – Regulation of capital 
flows 
– Current account 
surplus 
– Foreign exchange 
reserve accumulation 
– Overheating of the 
economy 
– Growing banking 
loans  
– The Investment level 
is close to the one 
observed during the 
Asian crisis 
– Current account 
surplus  
– Foreign exchange 
reserve accumulation 
– Overheating of the 
economy; 
– Foreign exchange 
reserve accumulation 
– Growing costs of 
sterilization  
 
No signals of 
undervaluation but 
– Fast growth of 
China 
– Growth of exports 
– High Saving rate 
– Same strategy as 
Japan in the 80’s and 
90’s 
 
RESOLUTION Three-steps reform : 
1) revaluation 
2) anchor on a  basket 
of currencies (dollar 
yen and euro) 
– Improvement of the 
banking system 
3) Liberalization of 
the banking system 
– Liberalization of 
capital flows 
– Floating exchange 
rate regime 
As  G/L risk of 
competitiveness 
degradation and  
exchange rate 
volatility. 
– Negotiation with 
Asian countries for a 
general realignment of 
the currencies. 
– Wide fluctuation 
band   
– Managed floating of 
the currency. 
Anchor to an Asian 
currency such as the 
Singapore, itself 
anchored to a basket 
of currencies (dollar, 
euro, yen and yuan).  
– The Chinese 
government must keep 
the 8.277 Yuan-dollar 
exchange rate stable 
– No more reference 
to exchange rate 
flexibility or 
revaluation 
– Introduction of  a 
wide fluctuation band.
 
 
1.2. The Chinese competitiveness and the level of the renminbi 
Chinese exports are very dynamic: they have been increasing by 15.5% per year from 
1990 to 2004 and more than 30% in 2003 and 2004. Chinese market share has steadily 
increased from index 100 in 1994, to 130 in 2000, and will be over 250 in 2005 (graph 6). Yet 
import growth has also been dynamic, closed to exports: 15.9% from 1990 to 2004 (graph7). 
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Chinese trade surplus is hence huge (60 billion dollars in 2004) but steady since 2000, around 
2.5% of GDP. It exploded in 2005 to 128 billions dollars. The Chinese external balance is in 
2005 of 148 billions dollars (7.7% of the Chinese GDP), the second of the world, behind 
Japan (158 billions dollars), before Germany (114 billions dollars): one cannot blame it for 
world imbalances. 
 
Graph 6: Chinese market share (index 100 in 1994) 
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Source: OFCE. 
 
The US and Europe have been recording large trade deficits with China, but those 
deficits have to be corrected for two factors. The huge Chinese surplus with the US and 
Europe is counterbalanced by the rising deficit of China with Asian countries. During 2002-
2004, more than 20% of imports or exports by mainland China have been freighting through 
Hong Kong. When Hong Kong is added to mainland China (table 4), the overall trade surplus 
slightly decreases. 
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Graph 7: Chinese Exports, imports (billion dollars, left axis)  
and trade balance (right axis) 
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Source: NBS. 
 
 
Table 4: Chinese trade balance in 2003  (billions US $) 
 Mainland China  
Mainland China 
and Hong Kong 
US 58 88 
UE 18 29 
Japan -14 -31 
South Korea -21 -27 
Hong Kong 65  
ASEAN -15 -30 
Other -65 -12 
Total 26 17 
Source: NBS, BEA, Eurostat and Asian Development Bank 
 
China is a huge assembly plant where lots of products are transiting to be transformed 
by a cheap, low-skilled labour force. Lastly, exports of China have a relatively weak 
composition in Chinese value added since they incorporate, in addition to the weak wages of 
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the labour, imported intermediate consumptions, but also the profits carried out by mainly 
foreign companies, re-exported or reinvested in China6.  
Chinese competitiveness does not depend exclusively on the exchange rate but also on 
structural factors: wages are low and stable because of the existence of a massive labour 
force. Half of Chinese exports are done by foreign firms located in China. They produce and 
export goods with high import content and are therefore hardly affected by the exchange rate. 
Many Chinese export prices are determined in dollar by foreign importers/producers and are 
barely affected by the yuan exchange rate. The dramatic increase in Chinese exports is deeply 
due to foreign firms’ behaviour, searching for cheap labour force. The fast growth of exports 
can also be linked with China’s accession to the WTO and the removal of customs tariffs 
(textile especially), which had been anticipated by the Western distributors, which had 
strongly increased their orders. In addition, the progression of the Chinese imports could start 
to be reduced insofar as certain multinational firms start to produce in China of the goods that 
they exported there before (Zhou, 2006).  
If some firms complain about competition from Chinese products, other firms or 
distributors benefit from the low production costs in China. The low prices of Chinese exports 
mean that, for a given value, they represent a large volume and thus have a strong negative 
impact on employment in the countries of North; at the same time, they reduce the price level 
to the West and increase there the standard of living of the households. 
 
1.3. Is Chinese foreign exchange reserves accumulation sustainable? 
The second evidence proving the undervaluation of the renminbi is the growth of 
PBC’s foreign exchange reserves (graph 8). They peaked at 846 billion $ in January  2006 
(609 billion at the end of 2004), amounting to 6.8 % of US GDP, 45% of Chinese GDP and 
13 months of Chinese imports. China has the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, 
before Japan (Table 5). Foreign exchange reserves are useful as a tool to deter speculation. 
This accounts for the building of foreign exchange reserves in Asian countries after the crisis 
of 1997-1998. Yet an excess of reserves can lead to a crisis, if the speculators consider that 
the exchange rate is undervalued and put pressure on an appreciation of the currency. The 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves stems from three channels: current account 
surplus, FDI and net capital inflows (excluding FDI) as can be seen form graph 8 and table 6. 
                                                 
6 The prices of Chinese exports can be overestimated if they are inter-firm transactions since firms can prefer, for 
taxation, reasons, to declare their profits in China rather than in their origin  country. 
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Chinese current account surplus reached 69 billion $ in 2004 (graph 8). It comes 
mainly from trade balance but also from the « other Transfers » account. Between 1994 and 
2004, the current account surplus has been steadily growing. 
 
Graph 8: The factors of Chinese foreign exchange reserve accumulation  (billion $) 
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Net capital inflows
Foreign exchange 
reserves variation
FDI
C urrent account
 
Source: NBS. 
 
 
Table 5: Foreign exchange reserves in January 2006 
(in billons of US $) 
China 845 
Japan  832 
Taïwan 258 
South Korea 217 
Eurozone 207 
Russia 182 
India 134 
Hong-Kong 128 
Singapore 118 
Source: IMF 
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Table 6: China’s balance of payments 
 2000 2002 2004 
Trade balance 29 37 49 
Income -15 -15 -5 
Other Transfers 6 13 23 
Current account 21 35 69 
FDI 38 47 53 
Portfolio Investment Assets -11 -10 20 
Other Investments -24 -5 37 
Net errors and omissions -12 8 27 
Reserves -11 -75 -206 
Source: NBS 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Massive FDI has been flowing to China over the last decade. One of China‘s policy 
objective has been to attract foreign firms to impulse its technical modernization. FDI allows 
China to acquire new technical knowledge and production techniques. FDI has been flowing 
to China since 80’s, because of its economic growth, its liberalization process and the opening 
of its markets. Foreign firms produce goods to export, thanks to low wages, but also for the 
domestic market, expecting a high level of development. There are tax incentives (no taxes 
for foreign firms during the first two years then the tax is 15% against 33% for others 
businesses). In 2004, FDI amounted to 53 billions $. From 1990 to 2002, the cumulated 
amount of FDI reached 424 billions $, making China the third most attractive country behind 
the US and UK. China has received 5% of FDI in the world and near 25% of FDI flowing to 
developing countries.  
 
Net capital inflows 
China’s financial account has not been fully liberalized yet, despite partial measures 
for capital flows liberalization in 2003. Capital operations are submitted to regulation and 
agreement from the authorities. Those regulations prevented China from being widely 
affected by the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. China has moved from a balanced capital inflow 
position in 2002 to a positive capital inflow position, around 110 billion $, in 20047. 
                                                 
7 Including  the lign “errors and omissions” in the capital flows. 
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Until 2000, current account surpluses and FDI’s were counterbalanced by net capital 
outflows. Therefore the foreign exchange reserves remained stable. But the net capital inflows 
have become large in 2003-2004, leading to a rise in foreign exchange reserves accumulation. 
This evolution stems from two main factors. First, the rise of financial returns and their safety 
have inverted the flows from the Chinese Diaspora. Then Chinese residents save and get loans 
in dollars through Chinese financial institutions. Since 2003, Chinese firms and household, 
expecting an appreciation of the currency, have increased their holdings in Yuan against 
dollars. Firms’ debts have been financed through loans in dollars. So as to meet the demand 
for dollars, despite a decrease in dollar deposits, Chinese banks have decreased their foreign 
assets and increased their debts in foreign currencies. The exporting companies hastened to 
convert their dollars into yuans while the importers delayed their payments. The main part of 
foreign exchange reserves accumulation since 2003 is therefore attributable to speculation and 
cannot lead to consider that foreign exchange reserve accumulation is a proof of the renminbi 
undervaluation. 
For a country it is easier to withstand net capital inflows than outflows because it has 
not to face any liquidity constraint and doesn’t have to borrow abroad. On the contrary it is 
harder to decrease interest rate than to increase it. China has not been willing to struggle 
against an appreciation of its currency through a fall in the interest rate (graph 9): China short 
term rate is slightly higher than the US and China long term interest rate (10 years) is 
significantly higher. Considering Mundell’s incompatibility triangle, the PBC has maintained 
an autonomous monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate, giving up liberalisation of capital 
flows. Chinese interest rates are nonetheless very low (2% for short term, 4% for long term) 
compared to real GDP growth. Credit regulation is mainly achieved through quantitative 
control and rationing. The viability of such a system is increasingly problematic (Prasad and 
alii, 2005): the exchange control is difficult to maintain in a foreign trade open country as 
firms since the companies can use payment delays and transfer prices to speculate. 
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Graph 9: Short and Long term interest rates in China an in the US 
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Source: NBS, US Treasury 
 
The inflows of liquidity into the banking system may increase credits and loans, 
inducing a rise of inflation and therefore an appreciation of the real exchange rate, despite the 
peg to the dollar (Box 2). This can be avoided if the central Bank sterilizes the surplus of 
liquidities by imposing obligatory reserves on the banks or by obliging them to buy Treasury 
bills. When the Central Bank accumulates reserves in American bonds, it benefits from 
interest flows lower than that which it would have obtained while choosing national bonds 
and runs an important exchange rate risk. To maintain the fixity of the exchange rate obliges 
the Central Bank to play against the speculators. 
 
Box 2: Sterilization and the exchange rate in China 
When a country has current account surplus or receives capital flows and wants to stabilize 
its exchange rate, its Central Bank is obliged to provide central money and to let inflate its exchange 
reserves. It results a strong liquidity of the banking system. To prevent that banks develop their 
credits in an excessive way, the Central Bank must sterilize these flows of capital. Sterilization can 
be made by an increase of the banks reserve ratio or by obliging them to buy domestic Treasury 
bills. In the case of China, the two types of operations have been  jointly carried out and 
supplemented by the control of the credits. The sterilization have a cost which depends on the 
differential of interest rate between the assets in dollars which constitute the reserves (to which the 
rate of appreciation of the RMB must eventually be added) and Chinese Treasury bills. The cost of 
the operation was important between 2001 to 2004 insofar as the American bonds offered a very low 
interest rate. A strong revaluation of the yuan would induce in an important loss in capital for the 
BPC: 5% of the Chinese GDP for a revaluation of 10% However, the operations of sterilization 
made possible to maintain the fixity of the rate of exchange renminbi/dollar, until the revaluation of 
2.1% of July 2005. In 2005, the Chinese authorities bought from 15 to 20 billions dollars per month.  
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Graph 10: Monetary base and foreign exchange reserves growth (in %) 
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Source : NBS. 
 
The growth of monetary aggregates in China does not come from reserves 
accumulation (graph 10): their evolution is quite different, especially after 2000, when 
reserves have been growing around 40% per year against 20% for monetary aggregates. The 
increase in money stems from a strengthening of Chinese households’ savings and deposits 
from the firms, reflecting the strengthening of speculative capital inflows. The inflation rate 
has remained fairly stable, taking in consideration the strength of the GDP growth (graph 5). 
 
Another look on the current account 
The current account is the difference between domestic saving and domestic 
investment. It is linked with the strong Chinese exports but it could also be linked with to the 
weakness of imports in a country where public and private consumption are relatively low, 
savings high and where growth comes from the investment boom (table 7). 
 
Table 6: GDP components (en % of GDP) 
 1987 1995 2000 2004 
Private consumption 49.8 46.1 47.2 43.3 
Public consumption 12.5 11.4 13.1 12.0 
Investment 36.1 40.8 36.3 45.3 
Trade balance 0.1 1.7 2.5 2.6 
Source: NBS. 
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Graph 12: GDP growth (right axis) and the sources of growth (left axis) 
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Source: NBS. 
 
China savings rate is very high : 42.5 % GDP in 2003 (table 8), 20 points higher than 
the average of the five large countries chosen by Kujs (2005). This comes from two factors : 
the part of the national income which is keep by firms   household savings are particularly 
highs (20% of GDP). The saving of the administrations is higher of 5 points of GDP; this 
excess of saving is transferred to the firms : the administrations finance large public firms for 
6 points of GDP. The saving of the companies is higher of 7 points of the GDP. Lastly, the 
saving of the households is higher of 9 points of GDP: the share of the income of households 
in the GDP is lower of 4 points; but the strong rate of saving of the Chinese households (25% 
of their income) induced a supplement of saving of 13 points of GDP. 
 
Table 7: Saving and investment in  % of GDP in China en Chine 
 China (2003) 
United 
States 
(2002) 
France 
(2002) 
Japan 
(2002) 
Korea 
(2002) 
Mexico 
(2001) 
National Saving 42.5 14.3 20.7 25.5 31.0 20.8 
Gap China/others countries:  28.2 21.8 17.0 11.5 21.7 
Households saving  11.8 5.8 8.4 12.1 8.6 
Firms saving  8.6 9.4 – 0.5 4.1 8.3 
Administrations saving  7.9 6.7 9.2 –4.7 4.8 
Source: Kuijs (2005). 
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Modigliani and Cao (2004) explain the high level of households saving rate by the life 
cycle hypothesis and reject explanations based on cultural or ethnical grounds. Strong 
economic growth and limiting demographic measures would have caused the rise of savings. 
The part of people under the age of 15 have fell dramatically, which, with the single child 
policy, has limited the role of the family and children in taking care of the older, being an 
incentive to save more. On the other hand, the enrichment has also improved the savings rate 
compared to the previous levels (5% in 70’s). This fact is reinforced by an imperfect pension 
system, introduced in 1997 (see OECD (2005, p187)).  
In addition, the saving of the households is undoubtedly reinforced by the constraints 
weighing on consumption: the foreign products are very expensive because of the low rate of 
exchange; the access to the products is not always possible, in particular in rural areas;  
regulations limit the purchase of some goods ( car for example); although its accession to the 
WTO will oblige China to change its regulations. 
Investment is the main determinant of Chinese dramatic growth: the Investment/GDP 
ratio in 2004 was around 45%. This level is explained as well by the force of the growth as by 
its industrial orientation.  Investment is mainly self-financed (table 9), the other part 
stemming from household saving, and to a lesser extent from FDI and the public sector.. Most 
of saving is channelled through the banking sector because agents cannot freely access to 
financial markets. 
Table 9: Sources of investment in 2004 
(in % of total investment): 
State 4.2 
Domestic loans 20.4 
Bonds 0.3 
FDIs 4.3 
Self-finance 51.3 
OtherTP8PT 19.5 
Source: NBS 
 
A deceleration of growth would have ambiguous effects on balance of the saving and 
the investment since investment would drop as saving. A rise of the consumption would 
require a rise on the part of the households in the GDP (by the rise of wages and a more 
                                                 
TP
8
PT grey banks loans (informal banking loans) 
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generous social policy) and a fall of the rate of saving (which would pass also improvement of 
the Social Security system). 
 
The weakness of the banking sector: the role of non performing loans (NPL) 
NPLs are high in China (table 10) in banks’ balance sheets despite the strengthening of 
the banking regulation committee, and the participation of foreign banks into several large 
Chinese banks. In June 2005, NPL accounted for 155 billions $ (9.5% of GDP) against 191 
billions in late 2004. The banks do not have yet the capacity of evaluating the quality of the 
projects; many financings are still granted to the large public firms for political reasons . The 
majority of the economists consider that the recapitalisation, the reorganization and the 
liberalization of the banking structure are preconditions to the opening of China to capital 
flows and to the floating of the RMB. In their absence, the Chinese banks could hardly 
intervene on the international financial markets and could not develop hedge instruments 
which would make it possible the Chinese companies to support the floating of the currency. 
Remain to know if this float must be an objective of the BPC. 
 
Table 10: Non Performing Loans (in % of total loans): 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Argentina 16 19.1 38.6 33.6 18.6 
Hungary 3 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.7 
France 5 5 5 4.8 n.d. 
Chine   22.4 29.8 26 20.4 15.6 
Hong Kong 7.3 6.5 5 3.9 2.2 
Japan 5.5 8.4 7.2 5.2 2.9 
US 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.1 0.8 
Source: FMI, Global Financial stability report. September 2005 
 
2. China equilibrium exchange rate 
Defining China’s undervaluation requires a model of equilibrium exchange rate 
determination. Three main models have been used to estimate China equilibrium exchange 
rate: the purchasing power parity (corrected by Balassa-Samuelson effect), the Fundamental 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) and the Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate 
(BEER). Those theories will be further investigated in this section. 
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2.1. From PPP to the Balassa-Samuelson effect (B-S) 
According to the absolute version of PPP, the prices of two similar products, measured 
in a common currency, must be equal, warranting that no arbitrage can be made. Therefore 
the prices of the same product in Beijing or in NYC must, after conversion, be equal. Then the 
real exchange rate is stationary, constant and equals 1 according to absolute PPP. According 
to the softer version, the relative PPP, price and exchange rate variations must be equal in 
order to allow the real exchange rate to be stationary. Yet neither absolute PPP nor relative 
PPP have sound theoretical grounds. For absolute PPP, does it concern every product or just 
tradable? For nontradable goods, like the services, no mechanism allows a direct arbitrage 
between a haircut in New York and in Beijing. If PPP is designed for tradable products (such 
as copper), PPP can at best determine the International Division of Labour: the exchange rate 
between Poland and France doesn’t move so as to adjust copper production costs to be equal 
in Poland and France. 
In order to compare national standard of living, it is useful to estimate PPP (table 11), 
but those estimation cannot be turned into exchange rate rule. They are fragile because they 
don’t take the same goods basket into account to define the price level, those differences 
being huge for countries with different development levels like the US and China. For China, 
heterogeneity between areas is a major issue, weakening the use of a global index. 
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Table 11: Country rating according to GDP per capita and relative price index 
(2004) 
 GDP per capita Relative price level 
US 34,1 1 
Canada 28,5 0,86 
Japan 26,5 1,79 
United Kingdom 24,5 0,98 
France 24,2 1,29 
Germany 24,1 1,38 
Italy 23,3 0,93 
Spain 19,9 0,97 
South Korea 19,5 0,84 
Argentina 10,8 0,68 
Russia 10,0 0,37 
Poland 9,7 0,52 
 South Africa 9,5 0,45 
Mexico 8,6 0,44 
Turkey 7,2 0,48 
Thailand 7,0 0,46 
Iran 6,8 0,31 
Colombia 6,3 0,40 
Myanmar 5,7 0,04 
Ukraine 5,2 0,25 
China 5,1 0,22 
Philippines 4,1 0,30 
Morocco 3,6 0,40 
Egypt 3,3 0,35 
Indonesia 2,8 0,36 
India 2,7 0,21 
Viet-Nam 2,4 0,19 
Pakistan 1,9 0,28 
Bangladesh 1,7 0,25 
Nigeria 1,0 0,31 
Source: Chelem. 
 
The Balassa-Samuelson effect (1964) reconsiders the PPP and the stationarity of the 
real exchange rate, dividing the economy between a tradable sector, opened to world 
competition and a non tradable sector. The real exchange rate is the weighted average of the 
two sectors prices and will not be stationary. Real exchange rate can be decomposed into: 
* * * *( ) ((1 )( ) (1 )( ))T T NT T NT Te s p p p p p pα α= + − − − − − − −  
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The first term stands for the real exchange rate in the tradable sector (from the PPP), 
the second and third terms stands for the internal exchange rate (the ratio of tradable goods 
prices, Tp , to non tradable, NTp ). If the last two terms are considered, they represent the 
relative price ratio of domestic and foreign non tradable goods. Even if PPP were to hold for 
tradable goods, which is debatable, it wouldn’t hold globally if the relative price ratio is not 
similar in the two countries. Yet Southern countries are less productive in industrial tradable 
goods while the productivity gap is lower for services which accounts for a major part of non 
tradable goods. Hair-dressers or waiters have approximately the same productivity around the 
world, no matter what the level of development is. Then if productivity in developing 
countries is lower in tradable goods and wages in the non tradable sector equals the tradable 
sector wages, wages will be lower in developing countries and prices of non tradable goods 
will also be lower. During the catching-up process, productivity gains in the tradable sector 
will lead to a rise of wages in all sectors, leading to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
The B-S effect can explain that the lower the price level in a country, the less productive is 
the country  (table 11). 
As a result, China’s low price level cannot account for the renminbi’s undervaluation. 
China’s price level can just be compared with other developing countries. Compared with 
Ukraine, Vietnam or other Asian countries, the Chinese case is not that odd. The Asian 
currencies are, ceteris paribus, lower than most African currencies, but those countries cannot 
be a reference in terms of growth strategy. 
Frankel (2004) estimates a regression linking the relative price level to GDP per 
capita. For the year 2000, its results are: 
(12,3)
log (PR) = - 4,15 + 0,38   log (Y/N) .  
According to that regression, the “good” relative price level between China and the US 
would be 36.2% (instead of 23.1%), indicating a need of a 57% Yuan appreciationTP9 PT. Yet the 
regression is not very accurate, with a standard error of 39%. The results could be improved 
when other determinants are taking into account such as the need for growth. Those estimates 
show that the renminbi is undervalued compared with other developing countries, but they do 
not show that this undervaluation could be detrimental to development. 
Coudert and Couharde (2005) show that there is no Balassa-Samuelson effect in China 
between 1998 and 2002: the real exchange rate has not been appreciating in connection with 
the relative gap between consumer and producer prices. This result can be explained by a 
                                                 
TP
9
PTUsing a similar method, Coudert et Couharde (2005) find a 43 to 50% undervaluation for the renminbi-dollar 
exchange rate in 2003.  
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statistical bias (the gap used is partially reflecting the price gap between the tradable and non 
tradable sectors; during the catching-up process, Chinese products evolve; Chinese industrial 
products don’t have the same price as American’s), or by the theoretical reasons put forward 
by the authors : there is no wage equalization between the tradable and non tradable sectors in 
China and many prices are still managed. Finally, Chinese growth per capita can be a 
consequence of a massive transfer of workers form agriculture to industry, more than the 
effect of a stronger productivity. 
 
2.2. The Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) 
Williamson (1983, 1984) defines the FEER as the exchange rate that allows internal 
(output at its potential) and external equilibrium (sustainable current account position). More 
precisely, the FEER is « [the real exchange rate] which is expected to generate a current 
account surplus or deficit equal to the underlying capital flow over the cycle, given that the 
country is pursuing « internal balance » as best as it can and not restricting trade for balance 
of payments reasons ». The FEER is therefore a medium run concept. If the FEER approach 
can be criticized because of its theoretical inconsistencies (see Bouveret and Sterdyniak, 
2005), it raises the issue of defining the exchange rate in a multinational framework, taking 
the full employment and the current account targets into account. Here we focus on its 
application to emerging economies such as China. 
Three problems are to be solved. On the one hand, the target current account needs to 
be defined. The common use is to choose a level at which the basis balance (including FDI) is 
equilibrated. In the Chinese case, Williamson and Mahar (1998) estimate it at -2.8% of GDP 
while Williamson estimates it at -1% and Coudert and Couharde at -1.5%. Yet the choice is 
relatively arbitrary. A country may want to have a significant margin to avoid exchange rate 
fluctuations or because it expects future consumption growth. 
On the other hand, the FEER implies external equilibrium at full employment, which 
is debatable for developed countries, even if full employment is measured by the natural rate 
of unemployment. This point is even more debatable for developing economies. Emerging 
economies are catching-up. They face massive unemployment and in China’s case, a massive 
underemployed labour force. They face a supply constraint: they need to accumulate capital 
so as to increase employment. This implies a high return for national and foreign capital and a 
strong demand to pull growth. By definition growth is not an equilibrium process. For China, 
the authorities have chosen an export led growth strategy. Then the dollar-renminbi exchange 
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rate is crucial for this policy as a factor of competitiveness. It can be considered as a policy 
tool, aiming at improving growth. Yet equilibrium exchange rate theories do not shed light on 
economic policies.  
Lastly, it should be supposed that the authorities have sufficient instruments economic 
policy to maintain the full employment with fundamental balance balanced, which poses 
problem for China. The authorities chose a development impelled by the foreign trade, which 
also tends to develop the investment. A development impelled by consumption would run up 
quickly against external pressure and the insufficiency of capital. 
Using an econometric framework, Jeong and Mazier (2003) estimate current account 
targets, distinguishing industrialized and emerging countries. The current account target is 
supposed to be an increasing function of fiscal surplus, GDP per capita, net foreign assets (in 
contradiction with the theory); a decreasing function of net FDI inflows. For China their 
equation amounts to a -1.5% norm (mainly because of FDI inflows). The gap between 
realized and potential output is measured by HP filter on industrial output: the need for 
growth is not taking into account. The Yuan appears to be undervalued by 60% against the 
dollar in 2000. Coudert and Couharde (2005) apply the same method and use a target of -
2.8% (from Williamson) or -1.5% (from Jeong and Mazier), they obtain an undervaluation of 
the RMB between 44 and 54% in 2003. 
 
2.3. The Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate, an empirical method 
Several articles estimate China’s equilibrium exchange rate using the BEER method, 
put forward by Clark and MacDonald (1997). They assess a long run relationship between the 
real exchange rate and its fundamentals (mainly net foreign assets and productivity), then 
estimate econometrically the exchange rate adjustment using error-correction model (see 
Bouveret and Sterdyniak, 2005). The fundamentals commonly used are: (Table 11): 
— The change in relative productivity which implies a real exchange rate appreciation 
according to the B-S effect. Empirically, relative productivity is often proxied by the 
consumer to producer prices ratio, the former standing for all goods and the latter standing for 
tradable goods only 
— Net Foreign Assets (NFA). A country with a positive net foreign assets position 
gets income flows, it can therefore have a trade deficit, hence a higher real exchange rate. 
— Openness of the economy. It may require an exchange rate depreciation. 
Antoine BouveretTPP, Sana Mestiri et Henri SterdyniakTP 
 26
Unfortunately, the econometric method applied assumes the equilibrium real exchange 
rate to be equal to the real exchange rate, on average over the period. This is a very strong 
assumption: there is no evidence that the means over the sample period stands for  
equilibrium, even less an optimum. Thereby Wang (2004) reaches the conclusion that there is 
no renminbi undervaluation. This result doesn’t stem from the fundamentals but from the fact 
that the author has used annual data on the 1980-2003 period. The author estimates an 
equation with 8 independent variables (productivity, NFA, openness, a constant and 4 
dummies) and 24 observations. Because of the small size of the sample compared with the 
number of regressors, the point estimates are close to the observations, while the residuals 
centred around zero are supposed to represent the degree of misalignment. The more precise 
the equation, the bigger the denial of misalignment. Frunke and Rahn (2004) use a similar 
method over the period 1994-2002, and reach the conclusion of a null undervaluation on 
average over the sample, and 11% in 2002. 
 
Table 12: Some RMB  equilibrium exchange rate estimations 
Article Model Fundamentals Period 
Undervaluation 
against dollar 
Method 
Frankel (2005) 
PPP with B-S 
effect 
Relative GDP 1990 et 2000 -35% (2000) Panel 
Coudert and Couharde 
(2005) 
PPP with B-S 
effect 
Relative GDP 2003 
-50% /-41 % 
(2003) 
Panel 
Jeong and Mazier 
(2003) 
FEER 
Current account 
target of -1.5% of 
GDP 
2000 60% By country 
Goldstein (2004) FEER 
Current account 
target of -1% of 
GDP 
2003 -15-30% (2003) By country 
Coudert and Couharde 
(2005) 
FEER 
Current account 
target of -1.5% of 
GDP and -2.8% of 
GDP 
2002-2003 
-54%/-44 % 
(2003) 
By country 
Frunke and Rahn (2004) BEER NFA, productivity 1985-2002 -11% (2002) By country 
Wang (2004) BEER NFA, productivity 1980-2003 0% (2003)  By country 
Bénassy-Quéré and alii 
(2004) 
BEER NFA,  productivity 1980-2001 -47% (2003) Panel 
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Panel estimations are no more legitimate. Bénassy-Quéré and al (2004) carry out 
regression on a panel with fixed effects for each country. This amounts to assume that the 
equilibrium exchange rate has been equal to the observation on average over the sample for 
each country, and that the countries share the same structure of their economy because each 
fundamental is supposed to have the same impact on each country. A unique equation for the 
whole countries, implies that the same behaviour applies to every country, i.e to China as to 
the US. In 2003, the RMB would be undervalued by 47% against the dollar, this result 
counterbalancing a very strong overvaluation from 1980 to 1987. 
Equilibrium exchange rate estimations widely vary, depending on the sample, the 
model and the norm used. According to the articles, the undervaluation falls between 0 and 
45%. The uncertainty on empirical results underlines the care with which those results must 
be interpreted. The main flaws are nevertheless theoretical: the concept of equilibrium is 
barely defined. The studies concluding of a renminbi undervaluation against the dollar claim 
that the fixed exchange regime chosen by China is detrimental to the global economy, arguing 
that it would increase global imbalances. Finally, the undervaluation with regard of traditional 
standards would be the cause of a global economic imbalance. On the contrary, we argue that 
this undervaluation is a consequence of existing economic disequilibrium in China that it 
helps to correct. 
 
2.4 The US threats and their credibility  
“Because of this action [the 21PstP July revaluation] and China’s stated – and repeatedly reaffirmed – 
commitment to enhanced, market-determined currency flexibility, Treasury has refrained from designating 
China  [as manipulating its currency]at this time.” Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange 
Rate Policies, November 2005 
The United States have been putting pressure on Chinese authorities for several 
months, so that they revalue the renminbi.  Indeed, Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsay 
Graham have suggested a tax of 27.5% on Chinese products, until a large renminbi 
revaluation occurs. However, the vote of this bill has been delayed to autumn 2006.  
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988) explains that (Title 3, sub-title A) 
the State secretary of the Treasury has to analyze foreign countries’ exchange policies each 
year, in order to assess whether some of these countries manipulate their exchange rates in 
comparison to the dollar, to avoid any adjustment of their payments balance or to promote an 
unfair competitive advantage in international trade. If a manipulation of the exchange rate 
occurs, the State Secretary of the Treasury must implement multilateral negotiations (through 
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the IMF) or bilateral negotiations so as to allow a quick exchange rate adjustment. The 
concept of manipulation of the rate of exchange does not have a scientific definition; 
however, Goldstein (2004) or Bergsten (2006) define it as a fix exchange rate system where 
the accused country accumulates exchange reserves and require of the IMF to intervene, if not 
the United States will do it. 
The report to the Congress of May 2005 claims that the Chinese authorities must move 
to a more flexible exchange rate regime. The report of November 2005 underlines that the 
system implemented on July 2005 (nominal anchor to a currency basket with a fluctuation 
band of +/-0.3%) allows greater flexibility and improves the influence of market power. The 
report concludes that China is not manipulating its exchange rate but it warns that the next 
reports will carefully study if the Chinese authorities’ commitment in favour of greater 
flexibility is followed by appropriate measures, otherwise the US may implement sanctions 
against China. 
China and the US belong to the WTO, which weakens the credibility of those 
sanctions. A country cannot unilaterally choose to restore tariffs on imports, arguing that the 
other country manipulates its exchange rate. This amounts to open the Pandora’s Box. Thus 
the PBC ‘s governor, Zhou  Xiaochuan claimed in a speech on 20Pth P March 2006, that 
according to the articles of the IMF, a country is free to choose its exchange rate regime 
(managed, floating or fixed) and cannot be blamed for manipulating its exchange rate. The 
WTO aims at making countries take advantage of trade gains. Protectionist measures would 
be harmful to both countries. 
Chinese and American authorities’ behaviour can be analyzed through a simple model 
of game theory. China and the US have each a tool: the US can implement protectionist 
measures and China can fix its exchange rate. 
 
Case one: Tariffs are not damaging to the US 
Such a situation can be summed up by the matrix A. In a one period game, the statu 
quo is a dominant strategy for China. The US will therefore choose the tariffs. 
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                                                                                        Matrix A 
  The US 
  Tariffs No Tariffs 
Revaluation (– 15, 5) (0,0) 
China 
Statu quo (– 5, – 5) (10, – 10) 
Note: the pair couple (– 15, – 5) stands for China’s gains (– 15) and the US’ (5) when China revalues and the US 
choose to implement a tariff. 
 
The repeated version of the game is quite different. The US decides to implement 
tariffs in the first period and commits itself to remove it as soon as the RMB is revalued. In 
the next period, China may either revalue its exchange rate as an incentive for the US to 
remove the tariffs, or maintain its exchange rate at a low level. If there is a revaluation, the US 
removes their tariffs and China’s gains are: reval( ) 5ChinaG = −  and for the US: reval( ) 5USG = −  
If China keeps its exchange rate low and the US maintains their tariffs, the Chinese gains are: 
0
statu quo
5( )= ( 5)
1
t
China
t
G δ δ
+∞
=
− = − −∑  with δ  being a discount factor (0 1δ< < ) 
and for the US: 
0
statu quo
5( ) ( 5)
1
t
US
t
G δ δ
+∞
=
= − = − −∑  
China will have to revalue its exchange rate and the American threat is credible. 
 
Case Two: the tariffs are harmful to the US economy 
Implementing a tariff on trade may be harmful to the US, because tax gains for the 
State are lower than the loss of welfare for the consumers. The results are different (matrix B). 
In the one-period game, the Chinese dominant strategy is the statu quo while the US do not 
have incentives to implement their tariffs. The equilibrium is therefore statu quo without 
tariffs. 
 
                                             Matrix B 
  The US 
  Tariffs No tariffs 
Revaluation (–15,–12) (0,0) 
China 
Statu quo (–5,–15) (10,-10) 
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In the repeated version of the game the results will change compared to case one. In 
the first period the US implement a tariff, in the next period China can either revalue or fix its 
exchange rate. With a revaluation, used as an incentive, Chinese gains are: reval( ) 5ChinaG = −  
and for the US: reval( ) 15USG = −  . If China keeps its exchange rate at a low level and the US 
their tariffs, gains are: 
0
statu quo
5( ) ( 5)
1
t
China
t
G δ δ
+∞
=
= − = − −∑  
and for the US: 
0
statu quo
15( ) ( 15)
1
t
US
t
G δ δ
+∞
=
= − = − −∑  
 
Both countries are worst off when non cooperative behaviour is chosen. Yet in this 
case, the American tariffs are not credible. If the US choose the statu quo without tariffs, they 
get 
statu quo without tariffs statu quo
10 15( ) ( )
1 1US US
G Gδ δ= − > = −− −  
Their gains are higher than in the non cooperative solution, and China gets: 
10(statu quo without tariffs)
1China
G δ= −  
The American sanctions are therefore not credible because if China chooses the non 
cooperative behaviour, American losses are higher than those from the statu quo. 
Conclusion:  
The results of the game depend on each player credibility. On the one hand, the US 
have shown their tenacity against China in several reports, reinforcing the credibility of their 
threats. Yet international trade theory shows that case two is more realistic, reducing 
America’s credibility, in conjunction with America’s belonging to the WTO. Theoretically, 
WTO members are not allowed to implement unilateral tariffs. The 2.1% revaluation of the 
21 Pst P July 2005 can be analyzed as a political choice, showing the commitment of China. On 
the other hand, the smallness of the revaluation can be analysed as a proof that China doesn’t 
want a significant, large revaluation. 
 
3. A Chinese growth model 
The renminbi undervaluation is questionable on theoretical and empirical grounds. In 
this section we will analyze a model showing the possibility of an undervaluation of the 
exchange rate according to the traditional standards (PPP, FEER, BEER), but compatible with 
a development strategy. In this framework, the exchange rate is a tool to reach an objective of 
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full-employment of an underemployed labour force. The model can be linked with Dooley 
and alii. (2004) works (Box 3). 
 
 
Box 3: the model of Dooley and alii (2004) 
Dooley and alii (2004) analyze the level of the renminbi as a choice of Chinese 
authorities and the advent of a Bretton Woods II (BW2). Facing massive unemployment (around 
200 millions according to Garber (2004)), the Chinese government has chosen an exchange rate-
led strategy to incorporate the labour force into the modern economic system. China has huge 
savings (household and firms savings) but, as the NPL shows, its banking system is plagued and is 
not able to play its role of financial intermediation. A low exchange rate can raise the foreign 
demand for Chinese goods and FDI so as to improve China’s technological and managerial 
catching-up process. Low real wages and exchange rate allows high and stable returns on foreign 
capital in dollars. 
The authors claim that a BW2 has emerged. China has chosen an export-led growth 
model, inducing tensions with its trade partners, such as the US; this cost is counterbalanced by 
high returns for American investors in China. Those profits may make the American investors act 
as a lobby, against the industrial lobby. Chinese government accumulate foreign exchange 
reserves to stabilize the exchange rate; its reserves are collateral for foreign investors. The 
advantages of such system are the following: China attracts FDI and reduce underemployment 
through its exports; the US have a trade deficit with China but China finances their deficit and 
American investors earn higher returns. The gap between the profit rate in China and interest rate 
in the US is earnings for the US Multinational Firms, because of their ability to raise Chinese 
GDP, and their role as lobbyists. The renminbi-dollar exchange rate does not appear to be a 
indicator of economic disequilibrium but an equilibrium vector for China, and to a lesser extent 
for the US.  
This thesis is disputed by Goldstein and Lardy (2005) which claim that the FDI play only 
a minor role in the Chinese growth, and the system BW2 is very expensive for the PBC (which 
runs the risk to see its foreign exchange reserves experiencing a strong depreciation). They claim 
that the American firms producing in China do not make there exceptional profits, that they do not 
play the role of lobbyists in the United States, and do not view the Chinese foreign exchange 
reserves as a collateral. In short, they think that China could give up the current specificities of its 
strategy without losing much in growth. They estimate that the system is not durably bearable 
because the PBC will not agree to constantly accumulate risky stocks of foreign assets. 
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3.1. The model 
Contrary to Dooley and alii (2004), our model is explicitly defined. FDI play no role 
because China isn’t facing a financing problem: self-financing and households savings are 
high (despite NPL), and FDI, despite important in value, account for 5% of total investment. 
The main idea is the following: China has a huge unemployed labour force and seeks 
to integrate it into the economic system. Without trade, Investment would be low because 
domestic demand is low. China is facing a demand problem and not a financing problem. 
Lowering its exchange rate enables to raise the Chinese competitiveness through the real 
exchange rate. The increase in demand leads to a rise in Investment, and a fall in 
unemployment. Then Chinese wages and prices increase as a consequence of the rise of their 
costs. In the long run, the real exchange rate has appreciated, allowing trade balance 
equilibrium, and there is no investment (there is no obsolescence in the model) when the 
optimal capital level is reached. 
 
3.2. Defining the equilibrium exchange rate 
From a Chinese point of view, the equilibrium exchange rate is the exchange rate that 
impulses the demand enough to raise investment and decrease unemployment. Investment 
increases the physical capital in the economy, which, through a complementary factors 
production function, raises employment. Formally, the sums of investments must increase 
output, physical capital and employment so that the whole active population could be 
employed. The investment must therefore allow the economy to reach its potential. As a 
consequence, the authorities must fix the nominal exchange rate at a level which allows a 
significant increase in potential demand and in investment. The model is solved in a rational 
expectations framework: the path chosen is the only one that converges to the equilibrium. If 
the authorities could modify their policy during the trajectory, several exchange rate values 
would be possible. This point is not studied in this article. 
It is therefore possible to implicitly10 PT define a minimal value of the exchange rate, 
SBmin,, that allows the economy to reach full-employment. In the long run, the trade balance 
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gets back to equilibrium because of real exchange rate variations (employment increases, as 
the wages and in fine the prices), potential demand is equal to observed demand and 
investment is null. SBmin B can thus be analyzed as an equilibrium exchange rate, as in the FEER 
framework, despite that here it does have an impact on internal equilibrium and this 
equilibrium cannot be reached immediately. For an exchange rate value lower than SBmin, B (i.e. 
when the exchange rate is revalued), the rise of investment is not enough for absorbing the 
unemployed; in the long run the trade balance is in equilibrium an investment is null but there 
is still unemployment. Such an exchange rate can be undervalued with reference to traditional 
standards (PPP for instance), but because of unemployment it appears to be overvalued in our 
framework. 
In the model, the exchange rate, through its effect on potential demand, is used as an 
impulse tool of the economy. Its effect is strong in the short run and diminishes through time, 
when domestic consumption relayed trade balance as the source of economic growth. 
 
3.3. Dynamic analysis 
 Graph 13 shows the model dynamics when the government fixes the exchange rate at 
its equilibrium level. The low exchange rate raises competitiveness and potential demand. 
China has trade surpluses, and an investment boom which raises physical capital and 
employment. Then unemployment falls and wages rise, leading to a cost rise and finally 
inflation. The real exchange rate appreciates because of price dynamics and stabilizes 
demand. Household consumption increases and becomes the main source of growth. In the 
long run, the optimal level of capital is reached, wages are stable and the trade balance is at 
equilibrium because of the real exchange rate. 
Graph 14 shows a variant where the exchange rate is overvalued. This can be the case 
if the Chinese government decides to appreciate its currency because of American pressure. 
Then the initial exchange rate depreciation is not strong enough for unemployment to 
disappear. Employment increases but the rise of demand is not strong enough to dramatically 
raise investment and employment. 
The simulations of the model show that the exchange rate can be undervalued with reference 
to the PPP or FEER criterion, and be in equilibrium in more realistic framework.  
 
3.4. On the usefulness of equilibrium definition 
There are as many equilibrium exchange rates as economic policy strategies. In the 
model the equilibrium exchange rate must allow enough growth to absorb unemployment in 
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China. The equilibrium exchange rate cannot be obtained immediately, because it would 
diminish incentives to invest in China. From this point of view, this model defines explicitly 
the link between the exchange rate and economic policy strategy. The model is relatively ad 
hoc. Of course it is just suited for China, but its goal is to show that there is an equilibrium 
concept for each country objective. The multiplicity of equilibrium exchange rates weakens 
the relevance of equilibrium exchange rates estimations, underlining Joan Robinson’s point 
(1947) when she asserts that “The notion of the equilibrium exchange rate is a chimera”. 
 
The equations 
/t tY K a=                                        (1)       0.5a =  
t tL bY=                                       (2)      1b =  
t tU Pop L= −                              (3) 
1( )
a
t t tI a Dpot Yλ += −                (4)       0.25λ =  
1 1t t tK K I− −= +                            (5) 
*( ) ( / )dt t t t t t tC cY W W cn s p pτ= + − −  (6)         0.5, 0.15, 0.2c nτ= = =  
1(1 )t t t tW r W Y C−= + + −               (7) 
d
t tW Yφ=                                      (8)         2φ =  
**( / )t t t t tDpot C D s p p= +           (9)           * 15D =  
t t t tTB C I Y= + −                         (10) 
(1 )t t tcu w pkχ χ= + −                 (11)      0.7χ =  
* 1(( ) )m mt t t tpk tpro s p p
−=             (12)        0.5m =  ; 0.15tpro =  
t t tw p L
α ν= +                              (13)      1, 0.05α υ= =  
(1 )t tp cuβ= +                             (14)        0.34β =  
 
with: Y, output ; K, physical capital stock ; L, Employment ; Pop, potential population ; 
U Unemployed; I, Investment ; Dpot, Potential Demand ; s, nominal exchange rate (a rise is a 
renminbi depreciation) ; cu, unit cost ; w, nominal wages ; pk, capital price ; p, Chinese 
producer prices ; C, Consumption ; W, household wealth. 
 
Comments 
The production function is a Leontief (fixed proportions technology) function; output 
is limited by capital stock (1 and 2). Investment adjusts to the gap between potential demand 
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and expected output for the next period (4). Consumption depends on income and the gap 
between current and desired wealth, which depends on the income (6 and 8). Consumption is 
linked with the exchange rate because a real depreciation raises the domestic price of foreign 
products (hypothesis of a weak substitutability between foreign and products). Potential 
demand is linked with domestic consumption, foreign demand and Chinese competitiveness 
(9). Domestic production that is not consumed in the country is exported (10). Unit costs 
depend on wages and capital price (11). The price of capital depends on the profit rate, the 
equipment goods prices, of which m% are imported (12). Wages are linked with prices and 
output (13). Firms apply a mark-up on their costs (14). 
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Graph 13 : The exchange rate is at its equilibrium level 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
25 50 75 100 125
Unemployment Employment
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
25 50 75 100 125
RER Nominal exchange rate
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
25 50 75 100 125
Y DPOT
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
25 50 75 100 125
INV TB CONS Y 
 
 
The Renminbi equilibrium exchange rate: an agnostic view 
 37
 
 
 
Graph 14: The exchange rate is overvalued 
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4. What kind of exchange rate regime for China? 
In addition to the question of the revaluation of the RMB, it would be necessary to 
examine the problem of the optimal exchange rate regime for China. On July 21st, 2005, the 
PBC decided to move from a peg to the dollar to a managed floating exchange rate regime: 
“With a view to establish and improve the socialist market economic system in China, enable 
the market to fully play its role in resource allocation as well as to put in place and further 
strengthen the managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand, 
the People’s Bank of China, is hereby making the following announcements regarding 
reforming the RMB exchange rate regime: 
Starting from July 21, 2005, China will reform the exchange rate regime by moving 
into a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with 
reference to a basket of currencies. RMB will no longer be pegged to the US dollar and the 
RMB exchange rate regime will be improved with greater flexibility. The People’s Bank of 
China will make adjustment of the RMB exchange rate band when necessary according to 
market development as well as the economic and financial situation. The RMB exchange rate 
will be more flexible based on market condition with reference to a basket of currencies. The 
People’s Bank of China is responsible for maintaining the RMB exchange rate basically 
stable at an adaptive and equilibrium level, so as to promote the basic equilibrium of the 
balance of payments and safeguard macroeconomic and financial stability.” 
This text is conflicting because it announces in the same time a managed floating to 
maintain the macroeconomic stability and a “floating exchange rate” based on market supply 
and demand. China must choose its exchange rate regime between a managed float and an 
exchange rate based on the rules of the market such as all emergent countries (see Gharbi 
2005). The first option insures the stability of the exchange rate but it can induce conflict of 
interest between countries and it could lead to errors in the economic policy and crisis. The 
second option induces systematically a strong instability of the exchange rate because the 
market ignores the target of the monetary authorities. This strategy is not practicable by China 
as it has an important current account surplus. If the authorities don’t intervene, the exchange 
rate would appreciate strongly.  
The Chinese must also choose between maintaining the control of the exchange rate 
and liberalisation of capital flows. The exchange control makes possible to maintain the 
autonomy of the monetary policy; the internal interest rate can be disconnected from 
exchange rate expectations. But, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain insofar as China 
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has important trade in goods and liberalizes part of the movements of capital (FDI, income 
transfers etc). Liberalization would make it possible to let play “supply and demand”. But, 
this play would induce a strong instability of the exchanges and would oblige the Chinese 
authorities to deviate from their desired level  of exchange rate. If the market anticipates a 
value of balance of 6 RMB for a dollar and that the interest rate is 4% in the United States, as 
the Chinese interest rate of cannot go below 0, the rate of exchange of the RMB can hardly 
deviate from 6,24 RMB for a dollar, that is to say a big rise compared to the current 8  RMB..  
The contradictory character of the Chinese declarations is emphasized by the reference 
to a managed float of the RMB around a basket of currencies. The system as exposed by the 
authorities is asymmetrical and contradictory. The exchange rate of the RMB would be 
defined according to a basket of currencies. According to certain declarations, this basket 
would be composed of the dollar, the euro, the yen and the South Korean won. According to 
other declarations, it includes also, in a long-run perspective, the pound sterling, the 
Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar, the Russian rouble, as well as the currencies of three 
neighbours of Southeast Asia:  the Thai baht, the Singaporean dollar and the Malaysian 
ringgit. In fact, the PBC defines daily  a central value of parity RMB-dollar around which the 
exchange rate can fluctuate of +/- 0.3%.  For the three other currencies, the central parity 
would be defined according to the parity of the RMB /dollar, and of the exchange rate 
between the dollar and the currency considered, with a margin of fluctuation of +-3%. For the 
daily management, the RMB is thus not pegged to a basket of currencies but to only one 
currency:  the dollar, from which one deduces the exchange rate of the RMB against non US- 
dollar currencies (and one does not see the signification of the band of 3%).  For the long run, 
on does not see how the announced peg would be implemented:  weights were not specified:  
the PBC did not indicate if it maintains fixed the nominal effective exchange rate, the real 
exchange rate or if it intended to let the real exchange rate  one appreciate slowly.  So, the 
reform of the exchange rate regime induces many interrogations.  
 
4.1 In terms of what currency the central value of the Yuan will be expressed? 
Two practices are possible:  to use an international currency (the dollar, the yen or the 
euro) or to define a basket of currencies with weights reflecting the importance of each 
currency, as currency of the importers and of the export competitors.  The first strategy has 
the advantage of simplicity and transparency, therefore credibility.  But, it is destabilizing 
when the exchange rate of the central country undergo strong variations against the currencies 
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of the supplying countries, customers or competitors, which is often the case of the dollar.  
Stability against a basket of currencies allow the central bank to reduce the impact of the 
fluctuations of the exchange rate, but it can be opaque and easy to handle and thus not very 
credible.  
The peg to the dollar in East Asia and in particular in China is not only used because of 
the trade with the United States, but also because the dollar is used for the trade with Japan 
and in the Asian area.  The rigidity of all the Asian currencies against the dollar avoid a strong 
instability of the bilateral exchange rates in Asia and compensates, to some extent, the non-
existence of a regional monetary agreement.  
Frankel, (2004) considers that Asia needs today a central currency which could be a 
suitable peg for each country of the area.  The yuan cannot be a stable peg because China does 
not have a sufficiently open money market; the yen fluctuates too much against the dollar.  To 
facilitate the monetary integration in Asia, he proposes that Singapore unilaterally adopts a 
firm and transparent basket peg (dollar, euro, yen, and yuan) and that other countries in the 
region uses the Singapore dollar as their anchor to target their own exchange rate. But, the 
proposal is complicated.  An agreement to use the Singapore dollar as the central currency 
seems not very realizable.  The project does not settle the question of the suitable level of the 
Asian currencies.   
McKinnon (2005 a) criticises the claim of the BPC to practise simultaneously a peg 
against the dollar and against a basket of currencies.  It is obviously impossible since the 
exchange rate of the RMB against dollar and the exchange rate of the dollar against the euro 
determines the exchange rate of the RMB against the euro. ICI 
 
4.2 Can China maintain its exchange rate fixed?  
China used a fixed exchange rate against the United States for eleven years since 1994 
to 2005.  From Chinese point of view, this strategy was a success.  Inflation was suppressed 
and the economic growth was vigorous.  However, the viability of the systems of fixed 
exchange rate is reconsidered. The most resounding exchange rate crises of the last decade 
intervened in systems of fixed changes:  mechanism of European exchange rate in 1992/1993, 
Mexico 1994/1995, country of East Asia 1997, Russia 1998, Brazil 1999, Turkey 2001.  
According to its despisers, the fixity of the exchange rate is not sustainable on the long run.  It 
requires that the country laid strong constraints on its macroeconomic policy.  Its rate of 
inflation must be equal to that of the country of pegging (corrected by the Balassa effect) and 
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any rate going beyond must be corrected.  Its interest rate must be the interest rate of the 
country of pegging increased by the risk of devaluation perceived by the markets; and that 
prevents any monetary policy of stabilization.  These constraints can become so heavy that 
their containment appears not very credible for the markets, which precipitates the exchange 
rate crisis. So, The IMF advocates to give up the traditional fixed exchanges rate and to adopt 
the corners hypothesis, floating exchange rates or “hard” pegs like the currency boards.  But 
at the beginning of the year 2002, the collapse of the Argentina’s currency board made this 
regime not credible.  Williamson (2004) indicates several conditions so that the fixed 
exchange rate regime does not lead to a misalignment of the real effective exchange rate:  the 
economy must be open and small to be able to be absorbed by a significant monetary area; the 
major part of its trade must concern the trade partners to which the currency will be pegged 
and finally the country must be ready to adopt institutional agreements enabling him to ensure 
a credibility to the fixed exchange rate regime.  China is not a small economy and the major 
part of its trade does not relate to the United States but to the Asian region.  It is not ready to 
give up its sovereignty to adopt an institutional agreement like the currency board to reinforce 
the credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime.  However, China could maintain without 
difficulty its fixed exchange rate regime because of several assets.  It has, until now, 
preserved a certain exchange rate control, which enables him to resist to the pressure of the 
appreciation of the exchange rate; it maintained a certain credit control; being more threatened 
by an appreciation than by a depreciation of its exchange rate, it is easier to it to accumulate 
reserves of exchanges than to be involved in debt to defend its parity.  Does it have to put in 
danger the dynamism of its growth?  The first strategy would consist of a simple adjustment 
of its parity, followed by the return to the fixity of the exchange rate.  It would have the merit 
to show the goodwill of China and to reduce the American pressures.  But, this strategy is 
dangerous.  A weak readjustment could cause anticipations of later readjustments, therefore 
inflows of hot money and slightest inflows of foreign direct investments, the reverse of the 
required goal.  A strong readjustment, that is difficult to gauge precisely, would represent a 
danger for the Chinese growth. So, McKinnon (2004) considered that China must firmly 
maintain the parity of 8,28 yuans/dollar.  For him, to give in to the American pressures was 
the same as to involve China in a situation of deflation like Japan between 1992 and 2003. Mc 
Kinnon and Schnabl (2004) evoke the conflicted virtue:  in China today like once in Japan, 
the strong propensity to save of the population creates a structural current account surplus.  If 
the central Bank gives up the accumulation of exchange rate reserves, it must continuously 
lead an expansionist monetary policy in order to prevent the appreciation of the currency.  But 
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this policy runs up against a near-zero interest rate liquidity trap:  impossibility of fixing the 
nominal interest rates at negative values whereas the appreciation of the exchange rate causes 
a downward trend of the prices.  The risk is that the dynamism of the growth is  broken since 
competitiveness is degraded, the wages drop (because of the growth of unemployment) and  
the monetary policy is impotent.  
 
4.3. Fixed or flexible exchange rates?    
As we saw previously, the choice of the RMB parity is delicate.  It cannot rest on a 
concept of “equilibrium exchange rate".  China must choose an exchange rate which ensures a 
strong growth, while avoiding inflationary pressures and unbearable social strains.  Who must 
decide on this parity?  The international government or financial markets?  The logic of the 
managed floats is that it is the government (or the Central Bank) which decides changes of 
parity by a trade-off between inflation and competitiveness.  The logic of the floating but 
controlled exchange rate is that it is the market which decides, and the government settles for 
smoothing the fluctuations. Today China uses a managed exchange rate regime, because the 
RMB would experience a strong appreciation if the BPC did not intervene every day.  A 
system where the BPC would give up intervening would be characterized by a strong 
appreciation of the exchange rate, then by disordered fluctuations (like those which the yen or 
the euro knew) since that the market cannot determine an equilibrium exchange rate.  The 
strong appreciation would involve a fall of the activity, a deceleration of FDI’s inflows, a fall 
in the interest rates, then anticipations of fall of the exchange rate, etc.  No one wish that the 
exchange rate of China experience strong fluctuations, which would destabilize its foreign 
trade, its accumulation of capital and its growth.  The only alternative to the fixed exchange 
rate is a managed exchange rate with a slow and regular appreciation of the RMB. With such 
a regime, the speculators cannot anticipate to make profits when an exchange rate crisis rises.  
However, this option supposes that the government recognizes the need for an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate of China, which is not easy in a phase of extensive growth (increase in 
the production by rise of employment rather than by rise of the productivity).  A system of 
crawling peg where, for example, the RMB would be revalued from 3 to 5% per year, would 
suppose, in situation of free capital movement and taking into account the level of the 
American interest rate, a near zero interest rate in China, therefore, a big rise of the credit if 
the banking structure were liberalized. Consequently, this system supposes more or less the 
containment of the credit and exchange rate control.   
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4.4. Off-board projects 
Several American economists imagined rules of management for the Chinese 
exchange rate, where China would agree to let the latter fluctuate according to the goodwill of 
the financial market. These projects generally rely on the implicit thesis according to which 
there is a fundamental exchange rate the market could help to establish.  Williamson (2004) 
proposes for China to apply a mechanism of exchange rate which would combine its theory of 
the FEER (fundamental equilibrium exchange rate) with the BBC rule of Dornbusch: a Basket 
parity, a wide Band and a Crawl of the exchange rate. He proposes to define for each currency 
its FEER then to determine a limit of fluctuation or target zone around the central parity.  The 
monetary authority would have the responsibility of maintaining the real exchange rate inside 
the zone.  But, this does not answer the question of the definition of the domestic equilibrium:  
full employment of the current potential output or growth leading on the long run to full 
employment.  Williamson proposes to define a wide band of fluctuation (10 to 15%) because 
it considers that it is difficult to estimate the FEER precisely and to prevent the government to 
defend a misaligned exchange rate.  But this supposes that there exist a FEER that on can 
determine with precision.  The width of the band of fluctuation is supposed to let the 
exchange rate fluctuate with the fundamentals, without causing destabilizing anticipations.  It 
should help a country with strong but temporary capital inflows, to stabilize its exchange rate.  
Insofar as the operators of the market think that the band is credible, they will anticipate a 
return of the rate towards the central parity.  If the foreign investors estimate that the band is 
credible, they will rather hold account the value of the parity than the rate on the market for an 
investment decision.  Thus, any deviation from the equilibrium will not destabilize the 
decisions of investments.  But does such a mechanism make sense when the value of the 
currency depends on the interventions of the central bank on the exchanger rate?  A gap 
between the rate and the central parity can be interpreted like a temporary variation which is 
going to disappear or on the contrary as an indicator that the central Bank prepares a change 
of parity:  the band is stabilizing in the first case, destabilizing in the second.  Goldstein and 
Lardy (2003, 2004, and 2005) plead for a reform in three periods. First a “one shot 
revaluation” of approximately 25 % in order to restore the equilibrium of the fundamental 
balance;  then a "re-peg “of the RMB to a basket of currencies (dollar, euro and yen) with a 
band of fluctuations of +/- 10 %;  then, the floating of the RMB and its convertibility.  The 
initial revaluation would be significant; it would allow speculators to make important profits; 
the latter will anticipate that this type of profits will be repeated in the future.  One can then 
enter in a dangerous circle which will push the RMB up to a level where the operators on the 
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market will not anticipate any more possibilities of revaluation of the currency’s value, 
therefore where the exchange rate of China will not be competitive any more.  It is not in the 
interest of China to take this way.  The authors propose that China negotiate with its Asian 
partners to insure that they will simultaneously accept a general realignment of their currency.  
Thus, China will be able to avoid the sudden decrease of competitiveness which would be 
likely to result from the revaluation.  So, China should inquire its neighbours of sacrifice their 
growth to the American interests.  Is this in its own interests?   Then, Goldstein and Lardy 
(2003, 2004 and 2005) propose to surround the new parity by a wide band of fluctuations 
within which the authorities would take actions in order to influence the exchange rate.  But 
the exchange rate of the RMB is likely to become the “toy” of the speculators.  The second 
stage of the reform suggested (the aim of it is to end up with a floating of the RMB) is a series 
of steps: to recapitalize and to restructure the Chinese banking system; then, to liberalize it; 
then, to liberalize the capital flows and finally, to make the exchange rate of the RMB 
floating.  But, the authors do not prove that this programme inspired from the Western model 
corresponds to the stage of development of China and its needs for growth.  The opposite 
strategy - to maintain the exchange rate low and stable, to protect this level by interventions 
on the foreign exchange market, to avoid the inflows of hot money and to promote the FDI ( 
source of technological transfer), to exhort the banks to control the development of the 
national companies- has, until now, succeeded in China.  Should it be sacrificed to the myth 
of equilibrium?  The Chinese growth is not balanced, but can a vigorous growth be balanced?  
China requires a rise of wages, a more generous and more extended social protection, which 
will induce a fall of the rate of saving and a growth resting more on consumption that on 
export.  But, the crisis of growth, which a strong appreciation of the RMB would be likely to 
cause, would not make it possible for China to go in this direction. 
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